When classes of structures are not first-order definable, we might still try to find a nice description. There are two common ways for doing this. One is to expand the language, leading to notions of pseudo-elementary classes, and the other is to allow infinite conjuncts and disjuncts. In this paper we examine the intersection. Namely, we address the question: Which classes of structures are both pseudo-elementary and L ω 1 ω -elementary? We find that these are exactly the classes that can be defined by an infinitary formula that has no infinitary disjunctions.
Introduction
It is well-known that many properties are not definable in elementary first-order logic, even by a theory rather than a single sentence. Common examples are the property (of graphs) of being connected, the property (of abelian groups) of being torsion, and the property (of linear orders) of being well-founded. To capture such properties, one can pass to extensions of elementary first-order logic. This paper is about a characterization of the common expressive power of two such extensions.
The first extension of elementary first-order logic that we consider is to allow countably infinite conjunctions and disjunctions; this is, morally, similar to allowing quantifiers over the (standard) natural numbers. One can then define properties such as being torsion by saying "for each group element x, there is n such that nx = 0", or formally,
This work grew out of initial discussions with Vakili about the generality of expressing properties not definable in first-order logic in a pseudo-elementary way, and whether such phenomena might be of use for model checking (as the pseudo-elementary definability of graph reachability was used for model checking by Vakili in his thesis [Vak16] and with the second author in [VD14] This infinitary logic is known as L ω 1 ω . One loses compactness, but gains other powerful tools. For example, every countable structure is described, up to isomorphism among countable structures, by a sentence of L ω 1 ω [Sco65] . The second extension of elementary first-order logic is to allow existential second-order quantifiers. For example, the property of a linear order being non-well-founded can be defined by the sentence "there is a set with no least element". We say that such a property is pseudo-elementary. More formally, a property P of τ -structures is pseudo-elementary if there is an expanded language τ * ⊇ τ and an τ * -sentence ϕ (or τ * -theory T ) such that the τ -structures admitting an τ * -expansion to a model of ϕ (respectively T ) are exactly the structures satisfying P . We will describe both of these extensions of first-order logic in more detail later.
These two extensions of elementary first-order logic have different descriptive powers. For example, the property of being non-well-founded is pseudo-elementary but not L ω 1 ω -definable. Also, the negation of a pseudo-elementary property is not necessarily pseudoelementary, but the negation of an L ω 1 ω -definable property is again L ω 1 ω -definable. Nevertheless, there are properties that are not elementary first-order definable, but that are both pseudo-elementary and L ω 1 ω -definable. The property of a graph being disconnected is such an example; we provide a more detailed discussion of various examples in Section 3. The main result of this paper is a complete classification of such properties.
Theorem 1.1. Let K be a class of structures closed under isomorphism. The following are equivalent:
• K is both a pseudo-elementary (PC ∆ ) class and L ω 1 ω -elementary.
• K is defined by a ⩕-sentence.
There is some notation in this theorem that we must explain. First, there are some subtleties in the definition of what it means for a property to be pseudo-elementary, and in fact there are four different natural definitions (giving rise to three distinct notions). Two of them are as follows.
The negation, the property of being finite, is L ω 1 ω -definable by the sentence ⩔ n∈N ∀x 1 , . . . , x n (⋁ i≠j x i = x j ) but this sentence is not a ⩕-sentence because it involves an infinitary disjunct. Definition 1.3. The ⩕-formulas are defined inductively as follows:
• every finitary quantifier-free formula is a ⩕-formula
• if ϕ is a ⩕-formula, then so are (∃x)ϕ and (∀x)ϕ
• if (ϕ i ) i∈ω are ⩕-formulas with finitely many free variables, then so is ⩕ i∈ω ϕ i .
In one direction, the proof of Theorem 1.1 passes through a modification of the proof of Craig Interpolation for L ω 1 ω . This was originally proved by Lopez-Escobar [LE65] who also gave the following corollary: a property which is both pseudo-elementary and co-pseudoelementary with respect to L ω 1 ω (i.e., both Σ 1 1 and Π 1 1 ) is actually L ω 1 ω -definable. So it is not too surprising that we can use similar ideas.
In the other direction, the proof passes through the coding of computable formulas in expansions of models of arithmetic. One of the results along the way is of independent interest. Theorem 1.4. Let K be a class of structures in a finite language that is axiomatized by a computable ⩕-sentence. Then K is pseudo-elementarily defined using a single sentence (P C ′ ).
We have not yet defined the PC ′ classes, but they are similar to the PC classes in that they are axiomatized with a single sentence rather than a theory. (We note that for classes which have only infinite models, PC and PC ′ coincide.) In particular, noting the fact that the conjunction of the sentences in an elementary first-order theory is a ⩕-sentence, we get the following corollary. Corollary 1.5. Every computably axiomatizable class in a finite language is a PC ′ class.
What this says is that an elementary class that has an infinite but computable axiomatization can actually be axiomatized by a single sentence in an expanded language. Unfortunately, we do not know how to reverse these results. We have the following conjecture. Conjecture 1.6. A PC or PC ′ class which is also L ω 1 ω -axiomatizable is axiomatizable by a computable ⩕-sentence.
The reader may wonder here why the connection with computability theory arises. It is, essentially, because a single elementary first-order sentence forms a computable theory with a computably enumerable set of consequences, and, on the other hand, that a computable set has a an elementary first-order Σ 1 definition in arithmetic.
The following result, in the special case of classes which are closed under substructures, has been known since Tarski [Tar54a, Tar54b] and Mal'cev [Mal41] . Theorem 1.7 (Mal'cev, Tarski, see Theorem 6.6.7 of [Hod08] or Theorem 9.14 of [HH02] It is obvious that a class axiomatized by universal sentences is PC ∆ and closed under substructures. We get the following new reversal of the "moreover" clause: Theorem 1.8. Let K be a class of structures closed under isomorphism. The following are equivalent:
• K is axiomatized by a computably enumerable universal theory.
The paper is laid out as follow. In Section 2 we introduce formal definitions of infinitary logic and pseudo-elementary classes and some basic results. In Section 3, we will give several examples. In Section 4, we prove an interpolation theorem which gives one direction of Theorem 1.1. Finally, in Section 5 we prove the other direction by coding infinitary sentences into models of arithmetic.
Notation and Definitions

Infinitary Logic
For the most part, we follow Marker's new book [Mar16] . We want to be precise with our definitions here, because we will need to encode infinitary formulas in first-order sentences. We first define L ω 1 ω formulas. Throughout the paper, let τ be a countable language.
Definition 2.1. The L ω 1 ω (τ )-formulas are defined inductively as follows:
• if ϕ is an L ω 1 ω (τ )-formula, then so are ¬ϕ, (∃x)ϕ and (∀x)ϕ,
• if (ϕ i ) i∈ω are L ω 1 ω (τ )-formulas with finitely many free variables, then so are ⩕ i∈ω ϕ i and ⩔ i∈ω ϕ i .
In general, we will drop the reference to τ when it is clear what we mean.
2. An L ω 1 ω formula is in L ω 1 ω normal form if the ¬ only occurs applied to atomic formulas.
Every L ω 1 ω can be placed into a normal form. The negation ¬ϕ of a sentence ϕ in normal form is not immediately in normal form itself. This gives rise to the formal negation ∼ϕ, which is logically equivalent to ¬ϕ but is in normal form.
Definition 2.3. For any L ω 1 ω -formula ϕ, the formula ∼ϕ is defined inductively as follows:
• if ϕ is atomic, ∼ϕ is ¬ϕ,
• ∼¬ϕ is ϕ, ∼(∃x)ϕ is (∀x)∼ϕ and ∼(∀x)ϕ is (∃x)∼ϕ,
• ∼ ⩕ i∈ω ϕ i is ⩔ i∈ω ∼ϕ i and ∼ ⩔ i∈ω ϕ i is ⩕ i∈ω ∼ϕ i .
We repeat again the definition of a ⩕-formula.
Definition 2.4. An L ω 1 ω -sentence ϕ is a ⩕-formula if it can be written in normal form without any infinite disjunctions. More concretely, the ⩕-formulas are defined inductively as follows:
• every finitary quantifier-free sentence is a ⩕-formula,
• if ϕ is a ⩕-formula, then so are (∃x)ϕ and (∀x)ϕ,
An L ω 1 ω formula is computable if, essentially, there is a computable syntactic representation of the formula. To define the computable L ω 1 ω formulas, we will encode in a labeled tree the way that a formula is built from atomic formulas. The labeled trees build formulas in normal form. The condition (a) below is somewhat non-standard in that we allow disjunctions but not conjunctions; this is merely a cosmetic change which will make our lives easier later.
Definition 2.5. Assume that we have a fixed Gödel coding of atomic τ -formulas, connectives, and quantifiers. A labeled tree is a non-empty tree T ⊆ ω <ω with functions l and v such that for each σ ∈ T , one of the following is true:
(a) σ is a terminal node of T and l(σ) = ⌜ψ⌝ where ψ is a finite disjunct of atomic and negated atomic formulas, and {x i i ∈ v(σ)} is the set of free variables in ψ; A formula code is a well-founded labeled tree (T, l, v). A sentence code is a formula code where v(∅) = ∅. The formula coded by a formula code (T, l, v) can be defined inductively in the obvious way. A formula is computable if it has a computable formula code, i.e., if T , l, and v are computable. Moreover, this relativizes: a formula is C-computable if it has a C-computable formula code.
Every formula is C-computable for sets C of sufficiently high degree. A computable ⩕-formula is just one that has a computable formula code that does not involve any infinitary disjunctions.
Definition 2.6. We say ϕ is a (C-)computable ⩕-formula if ϕ has a (C-)computable formula code (T, l, v) such that for no σ ∈ T do we have l(σ) = ⌜⩔⌝.
It seems possible that a formula might be both a computable L ω 1 ω -sentence, and a ⩕-sentence, without being a computable ⩕-sentence. This is analogous to the fact that a sentence might be both computable L ω 1 ω and infinitary Π 0 1 without being computable Π 0 1 . The satisfaction relation for L ω 1 ω is easy to define, but we will make use of the following witnesses to the truth value of a formula. If η is a (possibly partial) variable assignment, we will use the notation η x↦a to denote the modification of η to map x to a. Definition 2.7. Let M be a model and (T, l, v) a labeled tree. We define "f is a truth definition for (T, l, v) in M" as follows:
• The domain of f is pairs (σ, η) where σ ∈ T and η is an valuation of the free variables, and f (σ, η) ∈ {0, 1}.
• If l(σ) = ⌜ψ⌝ an atomic L-formula, then f (σ, η) = 1 if and only if ψ is true in M when we use η to assign the free variables.
• If l(σ) = ⌜∃x i ⌝ then f (σ, η) = 1 if and only if for some a in M we have f (σˆ0, η x i ↦a ) = 1.
•
• If l(σ) = ⌜⩔⌝ then f (σ, η) = 1 if and only if there is an i such that σˆi ∈ T and f (σˆi, η) = 1.
• If l(σ) = ⌜⩕⌝ then f (σ, η) = 1 if and only if for every i such that σˆi ∈ T , f (σˆi, η) = 1.
If ϕ is a formula with code (T, l, v), M ⊧ ϕ(ā) if and only if there is a truth definition f for (T, l, v) in M with f (∅, η) = 1, where η is the assignment of the free variables toā. We can even keep track of the existential witnesses that make a formula true.
Definition 2.8. A Skolem function for M and (T, l, v) is a function g which assigns to each σ ∈ T and valuation on v(σ) an element of M. We define "f is a truth definition for (T, l, v) with respect to g in M" by replacing the third condition above with:
If f is a truth definition for (T, l, v) in M, then there is a Skolem function g such that f is a truth definition with respect to g.
Pseudo-elementary Classes
In this section, we follow the book by Hodges [Hod08] . There are four different types of pseudo-elementary classes: PC, PC ′ , PC ∆ , and PC ′ ∆ . The ∆ means that we are allowed a full theory rather than a single sentence, and the ′ means that we are allowed to add additional sorts (elements) to the structure. PC and PC ∆ have already been defined, but we repeat the definition. Definition 2.9. We say that a class K of L-structures is a PC-class if there is a language τ * ⊇ τ and an elementary first-order τ * sentence φ such that
We say that K is a PC ∆ -class if φ is replaced by an elementary first-order theory.
The classes PC ′ and PC ′ ∆ are a little more complicated to define. We need the following definition, which one should think of as throwing away a sort from a structure.
Definition 2.10. Let τ ⊆ τ * be a pair of languages, with a unary predicate P ∈ τ * ∖τ . Given a τ * -structure A, we denote by A P the substructure of A τ whose domain is P A (if this is a τ -structure; otherwise A P is not defined).
The classes PC
′ and PC ′ ∆ differ from PC and PC ∆ respectively in that in addition to expanding the language, one is allowed to add additional elements.
Definition 2.11. We say that a class K of τ -structures is a PC ′ -class if there is a language τ * ⊇ τ , with a unary relation P ∈ τ * ∖ τ , and a τ * -formula φ, such that
We say that K is a PC ′ ∆ -class if φ is a first-order theory.
Note that, if the language is finite (or we are dealing with a PC ′ ∆ -class) it suffices to ask that K = {A P A ⊧ φ} as φ can say that A P is defined.
Though we have four different definitions, they give rise to only three different notions (and only two if we consider classes which consist only of infinite structures).
Theorem 2.12 (Theorem 5.2.1 of [Hod08] ). Let K be a class of structures.
• K is a PC ∆ -class if and only if it is a PC
• If all the structures in K are infinite, then K is a PC-class if and only if it is a PC ′ -class.
In Example 3.5 we give a class which is PC ′ but not PC. The proof of the first point in [Hod08] is not obvious and quite interesting. For the second, essentially the only reason that PC and PC ′ are different is that the model might be finite; if a model is infinite, one could just have the elements of the model "wear two hats", on the one hand being the domain of the expansion of the original model, and on the other hand playing the role of the elements of the new sort P . In our proofs below, we want to add on a model of arithmetic to a given structure; if the structure was finite, then as every model of arithmetic is infinite, we must add new elements. This is why it is PC ′ and not PC that appears in, for example, Theorem 1.4.
Examples
We give here a few examples of properties that are definable in various combinations of expansions of elementary first-order logic, including some applications of the theorems.
Example 3.1. Let τ = {R} the language of graphs. The class K of non-connected graphs is a PC-class. Indeed, an undirected graph G = (G, R) is disconnected if and only if there is a binary relation C of connectedness such that
• ¬(∀x)(∀y)C(x, y).
An undirected graph G is also disconnected if and only if
So K is also defined by a ⩕-sentence.
Example 3.2. Let τ = {<} the language of linear orders. The class K of non-well-founded linear orders is a PC-class as a linear order (S, <) is non-well-founded if and only if there is a unary relation U such that
K is not definable by any L ω 1 ω formula.
Example 3.3. Let τ be any language and φ a τ -sentence. The class K of infinite models of φ is a PC-class as A ⊧ φ is infinite if and only if there is a linear order < on A such that (∀x)(∃y)[x < y]. K is also defined by the ⩕-sentence
Example 3.4. Orderable groups are a PC-class. They are also universally axiomatizable by saying that every finite subset can be ordered in a way that is compatible with the group operation.
Example 3.5. There is a c.e. universal theory T whose models do not form a PC-class; by Theorem 1.8 they are, however, a PC ′ -class. The language of T will be the language of graphs. Fix an enumeration of the sentences φ n in finite languages L n expanding the language of graphs. Note that for every finite graph G, we can decide effectively whether there is an expansion of G to a model of φ n . For each n, let C n be cycle of length n. Then, let T be the theory that says that there is no cycle of length n for exactly those n where C n does not have an expansion to a model of φ n . Note that T is c.e. and universal, and that it is different from each PC-class.
An Application of Craig Interpolation
To prove the direction (1) implies (2) of Theorem 1.1, we will adapt a proof of the Craig Interpolation Theorem for L ω 1 ω . The proof we adapt is not the original proof by Lopez-Escobar, but one that appears in the book by Marker [Mar16] . We begin with a few preliminaries.
Lemma 4.1. If ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are ⩕-formulas, ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 is equivalent to a ⩕-formula.
Proof. We argue by induction on the complexity of ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 together. If ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are both finitary quantifier-free, then so is ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 . For the inductive steps, we will give the argument which reduces the complexity of ϕ 1 ; the arguments for ϕ 2 are similar.
If ϕ 1 is of the form (Qx)ϕ
where v is not free in ϕ 2 ; by the inductive hypothesis, ϕ
, and by the induction hypothesis, each φ ∨ ϕ 2 is a ⩕-formula. 2. if φ ∈ σ, then ¬φ ∉ σ; 3. if ¬φ ∈ σ, then σ ∪ {∼ φ} ∈ Σ; 4. if ⩕ φ∈X φ ∈ σ, then for all φ ∈ X, σ ∪ {φ} ∈ Σ; 5. if ⩔ φ∈X φ ∈ σ, then there is φ ∈ X such that σ ∪ {φ} ∈ Σ; 6. if (∀v)φ(v) ∈ σ, then for all c ∈ C, σ ∪ {φ(c)} ∈ Σ; 7. if (∃v)φ(v) ∈ σ, then there is c ∈ C such that σ ∪ {φ(c)} ∈ Σ; 8. let t be a term with no variables and let c, d ∈ C,
(b) if c = t ∈ σ and φ(t) ∈ σ, then σ ∪ {φ(c)} ∈ Σ; (c) there is e ∈ C such that σ ∪ {e = t} ∈ Σ.
A consistency property is in some sense a recipe for building a model. We are now ready to prove our variant of the Craig Interpolation Theorem. We strengthen the hypotheses to assume that one of the sentences is a ⩕-sentence, and in return, we get that the interpolant is also a ⩕-sentence. The proof follows the same structure as that of the Craig Interpolation Theorem in [Mar16] 
In the rest of the proof, we make the convention that if σ ∈ Σ and we write σ = σ 1 ∪ σ 2 , then σ 1 and σ 2 are the witnesses that σ ∈ Σ, i.e., σ 1 consists of ⩕-τ2-sentences, σ 2 consists of τ 2 -sentences, and they satisfy the satisfiability condition above.
We claim that Σ is a consistency property. The following claim will verify many of the conditions.
Claim. Fix σ ∈ Σ and write
Proof. We will show the case i = 1. We can write σ∪{φ} = (σ 1 ∪{φ})∪σ 2 . If σ 1 ∪{φ} ⊧ ψ 1 and σ 2 ⊧ ψ 2 , with ψ 1 a ⩕-sentence, then since σ 1 ⊧ φ, σ 1 ⊧ ψ 1 . Hence ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 is satisfiable.
We now check the conditions of a consistency property.
1. If µ ⊆ σ with σ ∈ Σ, write µ = µ 1 ∪ µ 2 and σ = σ 1 ∪ σ 2 where µ 1 ⊆ σ 1 and µ 2 ⊆ σ 2 . Given µ 1 ⊧ ψ 1 and µ 2 ⊧ ψ 2 , we have σ 1 ⊧ ψ 1 and σ 2 ⊧ ψ 2 ; hence ψ 1 ∧ψ 2 is satisfiable. So µ ∈ Σ.
2. If φ, ¬φ ∈ σ = σ 1 ∪ σ 2 , say φ, ¬φ ∈ σ i , σ i ⊧ φ ∧ ¬φ which is not satisfiable. The other possible case is that φ ∈ σ i , ¬φ ∈ σ j , i ≠ j, in which case σ i ⊧ φ and σ j ⊧ ¬φ, and φ ∧ ¬φ is not satisfiable.
3. This follows from the claim.
4. This follows from the claim.
5. Write σ = σ 1 ∪ σ 2 . We have two cases which are different, depending on whether
First suppose that ⩔ φ∈X φ ∈ σ 2 . Let σ 2,φ = σ 2 ∪ {φ}. We claim that for some φ ∈ X, σ 2,φ ∪ σ 1 ∈ Σ. If not, then for each φ ∈ X there are τ -sentences ψ 2,φ and ψ 1,φ , with ψ 1,φ a ⩕-sentence, such that σ 2,φ ⊧ ψ 2,φ and σ 1 ⊧ ψ 1,φ , and such that ψ 2,φ ∧ ψ 1,φ is unsatisfiable. So ψ 2,φ ⊧ ¬ψ 1,φ . Since
On the other hand,
This formula is a ⩕-sentence as each ψ 1,φ is. Finally,
which contradicts that σ ∈ Σ. Now suppose that ⩔ φ∈X φ ∈ σ 1 ; then X is finite. We begin in a similar way as before. Let σ 1,φ = σ 1 ∪ {φ}. We claim that for some φ ∈ X, σ 1,φ ∪ σ 2 ∈ Σ. If not, there for each φ ∈ X there are τ -sentences ψ 1,φ and ψ 2,φ , with ψ 1,φ a ⩕-sentence, such that σ 1,φ ⊧ ψ 1,φ and σ 2 ⊧ ψ 2,φ , and such that ψ 1,φ ∧ ψ 2,φ is unsatisfiable. So ψ 1,φ ⊧ ¬ψ 2,φ . Since
As X is finite, by Lemma 4.1 this is equivalent to a ⩕-sentence. On the other hand,
which contradicts that σ ∈ Σ.
6. This follows from the claim as (∀x)φ(x) ⊧ φ(c) for all c ∈ C.
7. If (∃x)φ(x) ∈ σ, then choose c ∈ C which does not appear in σ. Suppose that (∃x)φ(x) ∈ σ 1 ; the case where (∃x)φ(x) ∈ σ 2 is similar. We claim that σ ∪ {φ(c)} ∈ Σ. Suppose that σ 1 ∪ {φ(c)} ⊧ ψ 1 and σ 2 ⊧ ψ 2 , where ψ 1 is a ⩕-sentence. Write ψ 1 = θ 1 (c) and ψ 2 = θ 2 (c). We have σ 1 ⊧ φ(c) → θ 1 (c), and so since c does not appear in σ 1 ,
is satisfiable, say in a model M. Note that the constant c does not appear in the formula (∃x)θ 1 (x) ∧ (∀x)θ 2 (x), so we may choose the interpretation of c in M such that M ⊧ θ 1 (c). Then M ⊧ θ 1 (c) ∧ θ 2 (c).
let t be a term with no variables and let c, d ∈ C,
(a) This follows from the claim.
(b) Suppose c = t ∈ σ and φ(t) ∈ σ. Write σ = σ 1 ∪ σ 2 . Consider µ = σ ∪ {φ(c)} = σ 1 ∪ σ 2 ∪ {φ(c)}. Suppose c = t ∈ σ i and φ(t) ∈ σ j . The case i = j follows from the claim, so we consider the case i ≠ j. Suppose that σ i ⊧ ψ i and σ j ∪ {φ(c)} ⊧ ψ j .
(c) Pick e ∈ C which does not appear in σ = σ 1 ∪ σ 2 . Then if σ 1 ∪ {e = t} ⊧ ψ 1 and σ 2 ∪ {e = t} ⊧ ψ 2 , write ψ 1 = θ 1 (e) and ψ 2 = θ 2 (e). Then since e does not appear in σ 1 or σ 2 , σ 1 ⊧ θ 1 (t) and σ 2 ⊧ θ 2 (t). Thus θ 1 (t)∧θ 2 (t) is satisfiable. Given a model of θ 1 (t) ∧ θ 2 (t), setting the interpretation of c to t, we get a model of ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 . So ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 is satisfiable.
Since φ 1 ⊧ φ 2 , {φ 1 , ¬φ 2 } ∉ Σ as otherwise by the Model Existence Theorem there would be a model of φ 1 ∧ ¬φ 2 . By definition of Σ, there are τ -sentences ψ 1 and ψ 2 , with ψ 1 a ⩕-sentence, such that φ 1 ⊧ ψ 1 , ¬φ 2 ⊧ ψ 2 , and ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 is not satisfiable. So we have that φ 1 ⊧ ψ 1 , ψ 1 ⊧ ¬ψ 2 , and ¬ψ 2 ⊧ φ 2 . Hence φ 1 ⊧ ψ 1 and ψ 1 ⊧ φ 2 .
Thus ψ 1 is the desired interpolant, except that it may contain constants from C. Write ψ 1 = θ(c), where θ is an τ -formula with no constants fromc. Neither φ 1 nor φ 2 contains constants from C, and so φ 1 ⊧ (∀x)θ(x) and (∃x)θ(x) ⊧ φ 2 . Since (∀x)θ(x) ⊧ (∃x)θ(x), we can take (∀x)θ(x) as the interpolant.
We get the following corollary, which is (1) implies (2) of Theorem 1.1. Interestingly, when we apply the interpolation theorem in the proof, one of the languages contains the other (i.e., we have τ 1 ⊇ τ 2 so that τ = τ 1 ∩ τ 2 = τ 2 ). If it were not for our added assumptions on the form of the formulas involved, finding an interpolant would be trivial as we could just take the sentence in the smaller language. Proof. Let τ * ⊇ τ be an expanded language and let X be a set of first-order sentences such that K is the class of reducts to τ of models of ψ 1 = ⩕ φ∈X φ. Note that ψ 1 is a ⩕-sentence.
Let ψ 2 be an L ω 1 ω (τ )-sentence defining K. We have that ψ 1 ⊧ ψ 2 , so by the Interpolation Theorem, there is a ⩕-τ -sentence θ such that ψ 1 ⊧ θ and θ ⊧ ψ 2 .
Every M ∈ K has an expansion which is a model of ψ 1 and hence is itself a model of θ; and every model of θ is a model of ψ 2 , and hence in the class K. So θ defines K.
Coding Sentences in Models of Arithmetic
This section is devoted to proving the direction (2) implies (1) of Theorem 1.1. First, we will recall some facts about weak theories of arithmetic.
Weak Theories of Arithmetic
We will work with P A − , Peano arithmetic without the axiom of induction, which is the axiomatization of the non-negative parts of discretely ordered rings. A good reference for many of the facts that we use is the book by Kaye [Kay91] . We use P A − because it is finitely axiomatizable, and yet strong enough for our coding.
Recall that every model of P A − is an end extension of N. Moreover, if N is an end extension of M, and ϕ is a Π 1 formula in the language of arithmetic, then if N ⊧ ϕ then M ⊧ ϕ. So if a Π 1 sentence holds in any model of P A − , then it holds in N.
We will also use the fact that computable subsets of N are definable by Σ 1 and Π 1 formulas.
Theorem 5.1 (See Corollary 3.5 of [Kay91] ). Fix C ⊆ N. A ⊆ N k is C-computable if and only if there is a Σ 1 formula ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x k ) and a Π 1 formula ψ(x 1 , . . . , x k ) in the language of arithmetic with an additional unary predicate such that, for allā ∈ N,ā ∈ A if and only if (N, C) ⊧ ϕ(ā).
We will use this fact implicitly throughout to write computable predicates inside of a formula of arithmetic, meaning that one should replace the computable predicate by the corresponding Σ 1 or Π 1 formula.
Adding Tuples to a Theory
Fix a language τ . We will describe a theory T in an expanded language which is essentially the theory of a τ -structure augmented with finite tuples from that structure. Because we will be working within elementary first-order logic, we cannot guarantee that the tuples are actually finite, but rather that their lengths take values within an associated model of arithmetic.
Definition 5.2. Given a language τ , let τ tup be the three-sorted language with sorts M, a τ -structure; N, a structure in the language of arithmetic; and M tup , a structure representing tuples from M. The sort M tup is equipped with a length function ⋅ ∶ M tup → N and an indexing relation ind ⊆ M tup × N × M; we interpret ind(π, n, m) as saying that the nth entry of π is m. In a model A of T tup , we write A, A N , and A Mtup for the underlying sets of the three sorts. The theory T tup implies that given π ∈ M tup and i < π , there is a unique m such that ind(π, i, m); we write π(i) = m. This is the ith entry of the tuple π. The axioms also say that natural operations such as the concatenation of π by a single element m, πˆm, exists, or that π without its last entry, π − , exists. We can also view elements of the sort N as tuples using the standard coding of tuples of natural numbers.
Definition 5.4. Given a τ -structure M = (M, . . .), we consider M <N = (M, N, M <N ) a τ tup -structure with the natural interpretation of the language.
There is a natural generalization of end extensions of models of arithmetic to models of T tup with a fixed first coordinate M. The structure M <N plays the same role as the standard natural numbers here, i.e., every model is an end extension of M <N . We will just prove the facts that we need rather than developing a full theory of end extensions. We will also want to expand the language a little more by adding a unary relation R on the arithmetic sort N, and a binary function g∶ N × M tup → M. It is important that the range of the function g is M, the only sort which is fixed under end extensions. Let τ * tup = τ tup ∪ {R, g}. The following lemma proves that M <N is the smallest model with M-sort M. One could adapt the conclusion of the theorem to make a definition of what it means to be an endextension in this context. • A N is an end extension of N, and
Proof. Since A N is a model of PA − , it is an end extension of N, and so there is a unique embedding of N into A N .
We define, by induction on π , an embedding f ∶ M <N → A Mtup . By 2(d) there is a unique ε ∈ A Mtup with ε = 0. Define f (⟨⟩) = ε. Given π ∈ M <N of length n + 1, define
Now viewing M <N as a substructure of A, to see that if π ∈ A Mtup has π ∈ N, then π ∈ M <N , we argue by induction on π . For π = 0 this is clear. Given π with π = n + 1, we
As in models of arithmetic, the Π 1 formulas play an important role relative to end extensions. Since in this context the first sort is fixed, we allow any kind of quantifiers over the first sort, but only universal quantifiers (or bounded quantifiers) over the last two sorts. By a bounded quantifier over tuples, we mean that the lengths of the tuples are bounded.
Definition 5.6. We define the Π 1 τ * tup -formulas inductively:
• any finitary quantifier-free formula;
• (∃x ∈ M)ϕ or (∀x ∈ M)ϕ where ϕ is Π 1 ;
• (∀x ∈ N)ϕ or (∀π ∈ M tup )ϕ where ϕ is Π 1 ;
• (∃x ∈ N, x < t)ϕ or (∃π ∈ M tup , π < t)ϕ where ϕ is Π 1 .
These are all elementary first-order formulas.
As in arithmetic, if an end extension satisfies a Π 1 formula with parameters in the smaller model, then the smaller model satisfies the same formula.
Lemma 5.7. Let A = (A, R, g, . . .) be a τ * tup -structure which is a model of
Proof. By Lemma 5.5, we can view (M <N , R↾ N , g↾ N×M <N ) as a submodel of A satisfying the end extension properties.
We argue by induction on ϕ. Suppose that A ⊧ ϕ(ā). If ϕ is finitary quantifier-free, then
If ϕ is of the form (∃y ∈ M)ψ(x, y), then there is
A similar argument works when ϕ is of the form (∀y ∈ M)ψ(x, y).
If ϕ is of the form (∀y ∈ N)ψ(x, y), then given b ∈ N, we have A ⊧ ψ(ā, b).
The same argument works when ϕ is of the form (∀π ∈ M tup )ψ(x, π).
If ϕ is of the form (∃y ∈ N, y < t)ψ(x, y),
The same argument works, using the fact that each π ∈ A Mtup with π ∈ N is in M <N , when ϕ is of the form (∃π ∈ M tup , π < t)ψ(x, π).
Encoding Computable Infinitary Sentences
We are now ready for the main construction of this section. The idea is as follows. Given a computable ⩕-sentence ϕ in a language τ with no existential quantifiers, we encode that sentence into a finitary sentence in the language τ tup . Essentially, we will write down (making use of the model of arithmetic and tuples in a τ tup -structure) a finitary τ tup -sentence ψ which expresses the truth conditions for ϕ. The sentence will be Π 1 . Thus, given a τ -structure M, we will have M ⊧ ϕ if and only if M <N ⊧ ψ (by checking that ψ does in fact express the truth conditions for ϕ in this model) if and only if there is some A ⊧ ψ ∧ T tup with A M = M (because ψ is Π 1 ). We can then show that ϕ defines a pseudo-elementary class. In fact, by relativizing we can apply this argument to any ⩕-sentence because every such sentence is C-computable for some C; this is what we use the relation R in τ * tup for. For existential quantifiers, we need to make use of Skolem functions for truth definitions of ϕ; this is what we use the function g in τ * tup for. There are also some extra complications when the language τ is infinite.
We begin with the following lemma which does most of the heavy lifting.
Lemma 5.8. If ϕ is a C-computable ⩕-sentence in a language τ , then there is a sequence of Π 1 τ * tup -formulas χ, {θ s s ∈ N} such that for all τ -structures M,
Before proving this lemma, we show how to use it together with results from the previous section to get Theorem 1.1. Theorem 1.1. Let K be a class of structures closed under isomorphism. The following are equivalent:
Proof. It is immediate that if K is defined by a ⩕-sentence ϕ, then it is L ω 1 ω -elementary. We show that K is a PC ′ ∆ -class, and by Theorem 2.12, it is then a PC ∆ -class. Let C be such that ϕ is a C-computable ⩕-sentence. The expanded language is τ * tup = τ tup ∪ {R, g}, where R is a unary relation symbol on N and g is a binary function symbol N × M tup → M. Then, given a τ -structure M, by Lemma 5.8, if M ⊧ ϕ then there are R and g such that
In particular, there is an expansion of M to a model of these sentences together with T tup . On the other hand, suppose that there is (A, R, g) a model of T tup together with these sentences. Let M = A M . Then, by Lemmas 5.5 and 5.7, and using the fact that χ and the
Thus M ⊧ ϕ. So we have shown that K is PC ′ ∆ , as defined by these sentences and T tup . On the other hand, if K is both a PC ∆ -class and L ω 1 ω -elementary, then by Corollary 4.5, it is defined by a ⩕-sentence.
We now prove the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 5.8. Fix a C-computable sentence code (T, l, v) for ϕ such that for no σ ∈ T do we have l(σ) = ⌜⩔⌝. We may assume that τ is relational, say consisting of {R i i ∈ N}.
Let {ψ n } n∈N be an effective listing of all formulas that are finite disjuncts of atomic and negated atomic formulas over τ . That is, we can write, n,m,1) , . . . , x i(n,m,r(ℓ(n,m))) )
where P j range among the relations R i and their negations, and the functions k, ℓ, i, and r are all computable.
The function g is supposed to represent a Skolem function for ϕ. A Skolem function, as defined in Definition 2.8, is a function which assigns to each σ ∈ T and partial valuation v with domain v(σ) an element of M (which is supposed to be the new value of x i if l(σ) = ⌜∃x i ⌝). It will be convenient to view g as a function of σ and any partial valuation, with the property that g maps any two valuations which agree on v(σ) to the same element of M; the two points of view are interchangeable. We can express that g is such a function with the following Π 1 sentence χ:
To see that this sentence is Π 1 , we use Theorem 5.1: T and v(σ) are C-computable, and v(σ) is finite with a computable upper bound.
Define θ s to be the sentence
where ξ and ζ are defined below. This sentence will essentially say that for all sequences σ of natural numbers, and t, and sequences of tuples ρ, if (this is ξ) σ is a path through T ending in a leaf and ρ gives a partial valuation of the first t variables for each node on the path σ of the appropriate kind for a truth definition, then (this is ζ) the partial valuation at the leaf on σ makes the corresponding atomic formula true (with respect to the finite sublanguage consisting of the first s relations of τ ). One should view ρ as a length σ + 1 tuple of t-tuples, each t-tuple being a partial valuation. The formula ξ is
Essentially ζ is a satisfaction predicate. One has to see that θ s can be expressed in a Π 1 way. To see this, note that many of the functions and relations appearing in the formula, such as the functions j ↦ ⌜∀v j ⌝ and σ ↦ max(v(σ)), the relation σ ∈ T , and so on, are computable or C-computable. The theory T tup proves that σ↾ i and ⟨ρ(it), ρ(it + 1), . . . , ρ(it + t − 1)⟩ are unique, if they exist. From these facts, standard manipulations allow us to write θ s in a Π 1 way.
We now show that χ and {θ s s ∈ N} work as desired. First, suppose that M ⊧ ϕ. Let f be a truth definition for (T, l, v) in M with Skolem function g. We may expand g to be defined on pairs (σ, η), where η is an arbitrary partial valuation, by setting g(σ, η) = g(σ, η * ) where η * is η restricted to v(σ) (and by choosing any value when η is not defined on all of v(σ)). Thus (M, C, g) ⊧ χ. Fix s for which we claim that (M <N , C, g) ⊧ θ s . Suppose that we have σ, t, and ρ satisfying the antecedent. For each i ≤ σ , let η i be the partial valuation that maps x k to ρ(it + k). We claim, by induction, that f (σ↾ i , η i ) = 1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ σ . For i = 0, we have that f (∅, η 0 ) = 1 since M ⊧ ϕ and ϕ has no free variables. Suppose that f (σ↾ i , η i ) = 1. We have a number of cases:
• We cannot have l(σ↾ i ) = ⌜ψ⌝ unless i = σ .
• If l(σ↾ i ) = ⌜∃x k ⌝ then since f (σ↾ i , η i ) = 1, for a = g(σ↾ i, η i ), we have f (σ↾ iˆ0 , η x k ↦a ) = 1.
As
again, σ↾ i+1 = σ↾ iˆ0 , and η i+1 = η
for some a.
• If l(σ) = ⌜⩕⌝ then since f (σ↾ i , η i ) = 1, for each k with σ↾ iˆk ∈ T , f (σ↾ iˆk , η i ) = 1. Since σ↾ i+1 = σ↾ iˆk for some such k and η i+1 = η i , f (σ↾ i+1 , η i+1 ) = 1.
Thus we have that f (σ, η σ ) = 1. Fix ψ j such that l(σ) = ⌜ψ j ⌝. Since f (σ, η σ ) = 1, we have that ψ j is true with the valuation η σ . So there is some m ≤ k(j) with P l(j,m) (ρ(t σ + i(j, m, 1), . . . , ρ(t σ + i(j, m, r(h))))). Second, suppose that M ⊭ ϕ. We claim that for each g with (M <N , C, g) ⊧ χ there is s such that (M <N , C, g) ⊭ θ s . Fix g with (M <N , C, g) ⊧ χ. We will define a sequence of finite strings σ 0 ⊆ σ 1 ⊆ ⋯ ⊆ σ n in N <N , and partial valuations η i , such that for each i there is no truth definition f with Skolem function g on the subtree below σ i with f (σ i , η i ) = 1. As before, even though η i might have in its domain more than the free variables v(σ i ), by abuse of notation we can still write f (σ i , η i ) and g(σ i , η i ). Begin with σ 0 = ∅, t 0 = 0, and η 0 ∶ ∅ → M the trivial valuation. As M ⊭ ϕ, there is no f on T with f (σ 0 , η 0 ) = 1. Given σ i , t i , and η i , define σ i+1 , t i+1 , and η i+1 as follows.
• If l(σ i ) = ⌜ψ⌝, then end the construction.
• If l(σ i ) = ⌜∃x j ⌝ then let σ i+1 = σ iˆ0 and η i+1 = η x j ↦a i , where a = g(σ i , η i ). Since there is no f with f (σ i , η i ) = 1, there is no f with f (σ i+1 , η i+1 ) = 1.
• If l(σ i ) = ⌜∀x j ⌝ then there is a ∈ M such that there is no f with f (σ iˆ0 , η x j ↦a i ) = 1. Let σ i+1 = σ iˆ0 and η i+1 = η x j ↦a i .
• If l(σ i ) = ⌜⩕⌝ then there is k with σˆk ∈ T such that there is no f with f (σ iˆk , η i ) = 1.
Let σ i+1 = σ iˆk and η i+1 = η i .
Since (T, l, v) is well-founded, eventually this construction ends with σ 0 ⊂ ⋯ ⊂ σ n and η 0 , . . . , η n . Since σ n is a leaf, l(σ n ) = ⌜ψ j ⌝ for some j. Then since there is no truth definition f with f (σ n , η n ) = 0, if l(σ n ) = ⌜ψ j (x)⌝, then M ⊧ ηn ψ j (x). Let σ = σ n . Let t be the number of variables appearing in η n . We can consider each η i as a tuple of length t by assigning each unassigned variable to a fixed element of M. Let ρ = η 0ˆ⋯ˆη1 . Let s be sufficiently large that all of the relations P h appearing in ψ j have h < s. Then, by construction, this choice of σ, t, and ρ falsify θ s .
If we start with a computable formula in a finite language, we do not need any reference to the set C, and we only need one θ rather than the infinitely many θ s from before.
Lemma 5.9. If ϕ is a computable ⩕-sentence in a finite language τ , then there is a Π 1 τ tup -formula θ such that for all τ -structures M,
Proof. We can use the same proof as Lemma 5.8, but since the language is finite, we only need a single sentence θ s for some sufficiently large s; so take θ to be the conjunction of χ with this formula. Moreover, we can replace R by ∅ as ϕ is ∅-computable.
This lemma proves Theorem 1.4 in the same way that Lemma 5.8 proves Theorem 1.1; it is important here that P A − and the axioms for T tup consist of only finitely many sentences. Finally, we prove Theorem 1.8. • K is a PC ′ -class which is closed under substructures,
Proof. If K is a PC ′ -class which is closed under substructures, then by Theorem 1.7, it is axiomatized by a set of universal sentences. Let φ be such that K is the class of reducts of models of φ; by listing out the consequences of φ, we can enumerate a set T of universal sentences which follow from φ.
On the other hand, suppose that K is axiomatized by a computably enumerable universal theory T . By Corollary 1.5, K is a PC ′ -class, and since it is axiomatized by a universal theory, it is closed under substructures.
